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POLICY BRIEF OF CRES
PUBLIC FINANCES AND TOBACCO
TAXATION WITH PRODUCT VARIETY :
THEORY AND APPLICATION TO SENEGAL AND NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION 
The use of excise taxes – ad valorem and specific – as a means to control cigarettes 
consumption is a relatively new toolkit in many developing countries. There is a long and 
documented history throughout the world of governments implementing such tax schemes 
to generate revenues. In many instances, tobacco taxation has also been highlighted as 
an efficient means of mobilizing domestic resources to finance health and other important 
development programmes. The recent settings of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 
2030 United Nations’ Agenda for Sustainable Development have further heightened the ever 
growing interest in tobacco taxation. More specifically, the latest Agenda intends to strengthen 
the country-level implementation of the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Article 6 of the FCTC recognizes price and tax 
measures as effective means to reduce the demand for tobacco, and the guidelines for Article 
6’s implementation encourage the use of taxation in comprehensive strategies for tobacco 
control.
Tobacco taxation could also be used as an effective and important evidence-based vehicle to
help many countries achieve their long-term development objectives (?). As tobacco tax rates
in many low- and middle-income countries are currently low and demand for tobacco products
is relatively inelastic, many countries could increase government revenues substantially 
through tobacco taxation. By creating the fiscal space to finance development programmes 
while, at the same time, reducing tobacco use, tobacco taxation could indeed be a win-win 
policy for governments throughout the world.
Relying primarily on the World Health Organization’s Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) 
and other additional sources of data as well as on the results derived from a previous study, 
this research intends to: (i) determine which category of excise taxes is more appropriate to 
the market of cigarettes in Senegal and in Nigeria; (ii) analyze the impact on prices, demand 
and fiscal revenues, of an increase of excise taxes for the two aforementioned countries. To 
do so, we first propose a theoretical model of taxation followed by an empirical analysis of the 
cigarette market in Senegal and in Nigeria in order to understand which category of excise 
taxes – ad valorem or specific – fits best to the local context. This policy brief reports on the 
key findings of this study.
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Our model markedly differs from those by the 
introduction of product variety, with a direct ap-
plication to the tobacco market. The results of 
the theoretical model show that in the context of 
excise taxation, the number of brands directly af-
fects the degree of market concentration and the
marginal effects of ad valorem and specific ex-
cise taxes on the price of tobacco. In addition, 
the ratio of the marginal effects of the ad valorem 
and specific excise taxes depends on the mar-
ginal costs of production of the different varie-
ties weighted by the tax rates and the number of 
product varieties. The model shows that specific 
excise taxes are more appropriate to Senegal 
and Nigeria, given the very oligopolistic nature 
of their tobacco markets. This result matters for 
policy given the fact that excise taxes are exclu-
sively ad valorem by design in Senegal and in 
Nigeria.
Furthermore, we build on a simulation model of 
cigarettes taxation. More specifically, we esti-
mate the relative variations of demand and tax re-
venues as well as the critical taxation thresholds
steming from a continuous increase of excise 
taxes. The very low levels of taxation in Senegal 
and Nigeria indicate important fiscal margins for 
their respective governments. For instance, the 
rate of excise taxes for the most consumed brand 
of cigarettes in Senegal and Nigeria in 2014 was 
25 and 15.87% respectively. The overall levels 
Because the GATS surveys reports only three 
important tobacco brands for Senegal, we could
only compute the concentration index for the two 
biggest brands. A simple analysis of the market
concentration ratio in Senegal shows a rather 
strong market concentration of cigarette in the 
country.
In fact, the two most purchased brands in 2014 
– Excellence and Marlboro – represent together
nearly 70% of the market shares. This resembles 
a duopoly, either by design or by accident. 
Looking at the data inherent to Nigeria almost 
brings similar observations: the market of ciga-
rette in Nigeria is an oligopoly, where the four 
biggest brands share almost 80% of the market.
Because it does not internalize the market 
shares of all the firms within a given industry, the 
concentration ratio therefore does not provide a 
clear idea of the firms’ size distribution. It also 
does not provide further details on the competi-
tiveness of the industry. To curtail some of these
imperfections and shortcomings, we will eva-
luate the Herfindahl Index of the tobacco indus-
try au Senegal and in Nigeria. This index (also 
referred to as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
or simply HHI) is a measure of the relative size 
of the firms in relation with the relevant industry 
and is a reliable indicator of the degree of com-
petition among them.
Using the market shares provided by the GATS 
surveys, the computed Herfindahl index amounts
to 31.64% for Senegal and to 25.62% for Nigeria. 
These numbers confirm the conclusions induced
originally by the market concentration ratio in-
dices, with perhaps a greater clarity: (a) the 
market of cigarette is highly concentrated both 
in Senegal and in Nigeria; (b) this concentration 
is more emphasized in Senegal than in Nigeria. 
The main objective of all these calculations is to 
provide a rather reasonable approximation of the 
mark-up already exposed in this section, which 
in turn would help inform on the important choice 
of the appropriate excise tax – ad valorem or 
specific – for Senegal and Nigeria. Consequent-
ly, the specific excise taxes appear better suited 
than the ad valorem excise taxes both in Sene-
gal and in Nigeria. It is absolutely possible to en-
visage a situation where the two forms of excise 
taxes coexist in a more developed fashion than 
it is currently in Senegal and in Nigeria. This all 
the more given that the excise taxes on the sold 
cigarettes in both countries are exclusively of the 
ad valorem nature at the moment.
RESULTS
 Analysis of market concentration
 Relative variations of prices tax revenues
We develop a model of unique good with different varieties, which perfectly corresponds to the case
of cigarettes.
METHODOLOGY
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of taxation for the most popular brand of ciga-
rettes in Senegal and in Nigeria was 40.25 and 
20.63% respectively. Throughout the simulation, 
we borrow extensively from another study on the 
estimations of the price-elasticities of demand in 
Senegal and in Nigeria. It also appears that tax 
development does not have the same overriding 
implications for the two countries. Increasing ex-
cise taxes on tobacco in Senegal and in Nigeria 
drastically reduces its demand, but also implies 
a sharp decline in the tobacco excise revenues 
for the former and and a rise of fiscal revenues 
for the latter. This stark difference stems from the 
fact that the price-elasticity of tobacco demand is 
very high in Senegal (-1.124) while it is very low 
in Nigeria (-0.235). Finally, it is important to no-
tice that there exists a certain threshold beyond 
which tax increases cease to have a positive ef-
fect on tax revenues in Nigeria. This simulation 
model constitutes an additional contribution to 
the literature of addictive goods in developing 
countries in general and in Africa in particular.
(i) First, the specific excise taxes seem more 
appropriate for each one of these countries, 
given the oligopolistic nature of their tobacco 
markets. In an oligopolistic market of ciga-
rettes, specific excise taxes have a higher ef-
fect on the price. Given that price represents 
the major determinant of demand, it is impor-
tant for Senegal and Nigeria to give more im-
portance to specific excise taxes. The idea is 
not to entirely substitute the ad valorem excise 
taxes by the specific ones. It is entirely pos-
sible to build a situation where both forms of 
excise taxes coexist, which is not entirely the 
case at the moment. In 2014 for example, the 
rates of ad valorem excise taxes in Senegal 
and Nigeria were respectively 25 and 15.87%, 
while there was nearly no specific excise tax 
on retailed cigarettes in both of these coun-
tries.
(ii) While the double objective of simultaneously 
developing public excise tax revenues and re-
ducing tobacco demand is perfectly doable in 
Nigeria, such policy is not possible in Senegal
given all the current circumstances. This most-
ly stems from the fact that the price-elasticity 
of tobacco demand is quite high in the latter 
country (-1.124). Therefore, the Senegalese 
government should consent to give up on a 
certain fraction of its current excise tax reve-
nues if it intends to further lower the consump-
tion of cigarettes. A tax increase for all the to-
bacco users – and therefore of the prices, all 
things being equal – of 45% in Senegal would 
lead a decline by half of the tobacco demand 
in the country. This move however could imply 
a
28.36% decline of the excise tax revenues.
(iii) Given the very low value of the price-elas-
ticity of cigarettes demand in Nigeria (-0.235), 
the authorities in this country seem to have a 
higher flexibility, contrary to their counterparts 
in Senegal. In Nigeria, the objective of the to-
bacco demand reduction is not compatible with 
that of further mobilization of additional excise 
tax revenues. The country could therefore pur-
sue an aggressive taxation policy in order to 
control the demand of cigarettes. More speci-
fically, the Nigerian authorities could increase 
the current excise taxes by up to 162.44% be-
fore reaching a threshold beyond which fiscal 
revenues cease to increase with respect to 
their previous values. Such development could 
lead to a 62.11% of tax revenues. Beyond that 
threshold, the tax revenues begin to decline 
steadily. An aggressive taxation policy consis-
ting of increasing the excise taxes by 324.89% 
in Nigeria could help reduce the cigarettes de-
mand by 76.46%, while keeping unchanged 
the current level of tax revenues.
(iv) Finally, it is possible for each one of these 
two countries to put in place a differentiated 
taxation scheme: based on the geographical 
location in Senegal and based on the age cate-
gory in Nigeria. A 45% tax increase in the rural 
areas in Senegal could reduce the demand by 
74.44%, while a similar increase “only” reduces 
RECOMMENDATIONS
the demand for all smokers by 51%. It could 
therefore be possible to tax the consumers li-
ving in rural areas differently from the rest of 
the population and reaching the same outco-
mes. Equally, smokers aged between 25 and 
44 in Nigeria tend to be less sensitive to taxes, 
compared to the rest of the population. Howe-
ver, setting up a differentiated taxation sche-
me could face two major stumbling blocks: the 
incompatibility with the legislative frameworks 
in place and the problem of smuggling. Taxing 
differently many groups of tobacco users could 
be at variance with Senegalese and Nigerian 
legislations. In addition, differentiated prices 
by geographical regions could exacerbate the 
problem of illegal cigarettes smuggling.
All these recommendations stem from our 
early simulations, of which the key ingredient 
is the price-elasticity of cigarettes demand in 
Senegal and in Nigeria. The very low value of 
the price-elasticity in Nigeria, no matter which 
category of consumers is considered, testifies 
for a strong inelasticity of tobacco demand as 
a result of changes in price in this country. On 
the contrary, the very high price-elasticity of 
demand in Senegal could suggest that taxa-
tion might have reached its critical threshold, 
given the local circumstances, or simply that 
consumers in Senegal are more exposed to 
various substitutes to tobacco.
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